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ABSTRACT: This study explores the evolution of the global governance of refugees in light of studies on 
depoliticisation. Following theories on governmentality, it emphasizes the centrality of the concept of de-
politicisation when examining the narratives and practices implemented to establish an extraterritorial 
asylum system of humanitarian containment, detached from any ideals of inclusion and rehabilitation. At 
the same time, we recall diverse empirical evidence in order to stress the importance of considering the 
divergent effects of depoliticisation in geographically and culturally distant contexts. The survey in Ca-
labria, Italy, presents in fact the political attempt by its inner areas to foster autonomous practices of in-
clusion that contrast the securitarian shift of the global asylum system, as well as its national implications, 
recognising refugees as a strategic factor of economic growth and social innovation. In particular, we re-
veal the mechanisms through which new forms of local citizenship have emerged here, along with institu-
tional solutions specifically connoted by a bilateral and place-based approach to forced migration. These 
efforts persist despite the breakup of the current European refugee crisis which, however, now opens new 
dilemmas by diminishing the viability of refugee relocation within the internal areas as a truly sustainable 
process.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Beginning in the 1990s, the measures and definitions that underpinned the interna-
tional asylum regime established by the UN following the end of the Second World 
War, have undergone substantial changes, designed to pave the way for new govern-
ance models, which today represent a field of privileged analyses in relation to the 
concept of depoliticisation. This is what emerges from the important works we will 
confront here, in order to examine the diverse forms of depoliticisation operating with-
in the current international asylum regime, and also to underline the divergent territo-
rial impacts they produce in geographically and culturally distant contexts. An emblem-
atic example of these changes is found in the case of Calabria, Italy, where the empiri-
cal part of this work is concerned, illustrating policies and logics that deviate from the 
strategic guidelines of depoliticisation, thereby highlighting its limits and contradic-
tions.  
Indeed, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, by emphasizing the concept of 
depoliticisation, it is possible to grasp the origins of the current regulation of forced 
migration and its connection to the present European refugee crisis. To explain this 
evolution, many research studies have approached the theme of depoliticisation by 
first emphasizing the emergence of a new order of discourse, defining today's forced 
migration as a social menace and as a factor of international instability (Hayter 2000; 
Guild 2009). In other studies, the problem of depoliticisation is instead approached as a 
way to illustrate a new art of governing refugees, where politics abdicate responsibili-
ties and decision-making roles, enforcing bureaucratic discretion in the interpretation 
and implementation of laws (Flinders and Buller 2006). In these studies, emphasis is 
placed primarily on the shift towards new forms of extraterritorial governance, operat-
ing directly in the context of crisis, where refugees are systematically put at high risk 
and made dependant on international aid. 
It is interesting to note that the reappearance of the camp in the current interna-
tional geopolitical scenario, aroused growing interest in depoliticisation studies, and 
often shared various theoretical perspectives. Many commentators, in fact, identify in 
this extraterritorial confinement system, the symptoms of a political and cultural oper-
ation that, while criminalising refugees, proceeds to their social elimination by means 
of technocratic intervention which have the undoubted advantage of subverting states 
to internal democratic control. Indeed, the bulk of current forced migrations are unde-
niably contained in developing countries, inside reception camps that should be tem-
porary solutions but, over years, tend to assume the form of a permanent “state of ex-
ception” (Agamben 1995, 195-198; Agier 2002). At the same time, it is also evident that 
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the reality of forced migration does not adhere without tensions and brutal breaks to 
the humanitarian and decentralized approaches imposed by new global mobility re-
gimes (Faist 2013). Sociological analysis specifically emphasizes the growing ability that 
the refugees have to create for themselves, more autonomous, aware and organized 
movements in order to leave their countries (Mezzadra 2001; Castles 2003). Moreover, 
the intersection between stricter restrictions on the free movement of refugees and 
the inability of many states to escape the international human rights regime (Sassen 
2008), is at every turn creating a situation of structural disorder that illustrates the lim-
its of current political regulation at the refusal of its domain (Ambrosini 2016).   
Especially in Europe, where for many years emphasis was placed on border closure 
policies, the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring and further conflicts in nearby Medi-
terranean areas foreshadowed a completely new horizon and a real phase shift, where 
the dysfunctions created by the incoherence of asylum procedures in relation to the 
real dynamics of flows are stimulating critiques and responses that radically question 
the functioning of the European Union and its mobility policies (Zetter 2015). From this 
perspective, heterogeneous and ambivalent repolarisation phenomena are clearly visi-
ble, and this requires consideration of the structural features of contexts in which mi-
grations are territorialized, as well as the concrete local interactions of various social 
actors. We may in fact observe the uprising of nationalistic forces addressing radical 
closure objectives which are not always easy to root in the neoliberal context from 
which they initially emerge (Bazzicalupo 2014). But, at the same time, original solidarity 
experiences are emerging alongside new forms of local citizenship that prioritize the 
social innovation and the economic opportunities arising from migration (Campomori 
2008). As we will see later, it is just this kind of win-win logic which takes place in Ca-
labria with the regional spread of local prospects and practices of inclusion that, for 
both economic and ideological reasons, dispute the current international framework 
on asylum and its securitarian  approach. 
We will recall diverse empirical evidence in order to retrace the evolution of the asy-
lum system in Calabria, and stress the importance of no longer considering depoliticisa-
tion as simply a fundamental strategy of transnational flow management, but also as a 
bad policy, structurally insufficient and failing with respect to the complex reality of to-
day's forced migration and the multiplicity of actors dealing with this phenomenon. We 
will thus methodically restate the importance of linking the following levels of analysis: 
1) the macro level, which contemplates the influence of macroeconomic and geopoliti-
cal factors on the governance of forced migration promoted by the major supranation-
al institutions triggering the present neoliberal order; 2) the meso level, which ques-
tions the role of nation states and their mobility control strategies in relation to the ac-
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tual characteristics and dimensions of incoming flows; 3) the micro level, which finally 
compares with the local dimension. Starting from this analytical scheme, we will con-
sider the results of field research1, presented here in three sequential sections. 
In the first, we will focus on hypotheses that explain the transition of migratory poli-
cies from Fordism to post-Fordism, providing an appropriate interpretation scheme 
and restoring the complexity of the new global governance of refugees in relation to 
the concept of depoliticisation. In the second part, we will discuss the implications of 
this transnational system on the Italian reception system, including the evolution that 
occurred during the last period marked by the European refugee crisis. Finally, we will 
analyze the declination of regulations in the Calabrian context, and the motivations of 
the actors who contest it, articulating different levels of response that give weight to 
the territories and their specific features, re-politicizing them as a fundamental ele-
ments of legitimacy and belonging. 
 
 
2. Asylum, sovereignty and governance 
  
Studies which explore the operation of the International Asylum System in the peri-
od following the introduction of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees, generally tend to highlight how this regime served the strategic objectives of the 
Cold War, and also sustained Fordist development processes in a time characterized by 
a shortage of workers (Zolberg and Suhrke 1999). In light of these political and eco-
nomic considerations many observers explain why, throughout the period of bipolarity, 
refugees managed to impose themselves on the West as a moral category, always wor-
thy of asylum and assistance. Only in the 1980s did we experience a transition to a new 
restrictive phase, and it became more visible and acute with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Joly 1999), when new conflicts emerged on the geopolitical scene, resulting in a 
net increase in asylum applications (Unhcr 2016). However, immediately after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, refugees seeking protection were no longer seen as strategic weap-
on to discredit the socialist governments of Eastern Europe. And in addition, the reor-
 
1 The research started in 2013 and aimed to outline the evolution of local practices and policies on asylum 
in Calabria. Data collection was based on a multi-methodological approach: participatory observation and 
the implementation of 35 unstructured interviews with representatives from local and regional govern-
ment, and with the main exponents of the third sector involved in the definition of programs aimed at the 
reception of applicants for international protection. These tools have been designed to verify: the actors' 
orientations, interventions made, central aspects of governance and difficulties encountered in imple-
menting the various programs launched. 
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ganization processes of production triggered by workers' struggles and the oil shock of 
the early seventies (Fiocco 1998), began to cause ever more rigid and restrictive mobili-
ty control measures even against asylum seekers. Given the wide range of the phe-
nomenon, a comprehensive list cannot be reported on here. It is important to remem-
ber however, that in general these measures have: 1) Institutionalized specific forms of 
reception without freedom, engaging camps as the main dispositif to contain and con-
trol forced migrations; 2) Formalized new concepts and intervention practices that 
jeopardize the existing equivalence between asylum and exile, as the new concepts of 
safe areas and internally displaced persons explicitly do; 3) Fragmented the Geneva 
status of refugees in a variety of legal positions, far more precarious than in the past, 
which are now reversible and explicitly oriented towards repatriation (Zetter 1991). 
These measures have clearly revolutionized the functioning of the international asy-
lum system and the way it was connoted in the Fordist period, when refugees followed 
a steady path within their host society, intended to result in the acquisition of a new 
citizenship (Ong 2005). Since the late nineties, various research studies were designed 
to grapple with the facets and characteristics of this transition. These interpretations 
are based on different perspectives, but often converge to underline three fundamen-
tal depoliticisation mechanisms at the core of these new forms of regulation. Three 
mechanisms primarily based on the securitization, administration and humanitarianisa-
tion of the dispositifs of forced migration management. 
Specifically, some analyses focus on the spread of representations in which refugees 
are portrayed as impostors who unjustly abuse domestic asylum systems to regularize 
their presence, or to frame this phenomenon in the humanitarian and interventionist 
logic promoted by the West since the nineties. Many studies on the media’s treatment 
of refugees justly note that, when viewed from afar, refugees continue to be portrayed 
as blameless victims of bloody conflict while this perspective radically changes as they 
approach more developed countries to claim status recognition. In this case, Mares 
highlights, asylum seekers lose their initial veil of innocence, being transformed from 
passive objects of compassion to unreliable actors (Mares 2003, pp. 330-349). At the 
same time, new discursive practices emerge at the international level, emphasizing the 
effects of current global wars on the consistency of flows, as well as violations of fun-
damental human rights of the populations involved2 (Salvatici 2015). In both cases, so-
cial representations thus recur that hyper-politicize the issue of escape, presenting it as 
a threat to public order and international security. But, following Salter's parable 
 
2 A wide-ranging review of military resolutions and military interventions justified by the UN Security 
Council, in the interest of refugees, is found in Loescher 2001, pp. 175-178.    
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(2008), a social depoliticisation process is being activated parallelly, which many de-
scribe by pointing out the “loss of a collective consciousness of the deepest political, so-
cial and cultural reasons for the problems in question” (Salvatici, 2004, p. 7). A process 
that essentially implies that refugees are dangerous, weak or unreliable subjects with-
out acknowledging the root causes of present forced migrations, but rather homoge-
nizing diverse contexts of crisis into the same emergency discourse (Pandolfi 2005). 
And it is within this new cultural framework that another process of depoliticisation 
has emerged. One that visibly marginalizes the old relationship between politics and 
territory, to counter the governance monopoly and the benefits it offers in terms of 
flexibility, participation and efficiency (Gjergji 2016).  
The securitization of the discourse on refugees is in fact strictly connected with the 
promotion of new cooperative forms of migration management directed to include dif-
ferent national contexts, and to operationally interfere with traditional sovereignty. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) highlighted, above all, 
increased opportunities for cooperation that the end of the Cold War made possible, 
and the need to use these appropriately in order to establish a more efficient and 
globally interconnected asylum system (Chimni 1998; Loescher 2002); in the words of 
the UNHCR, to transit from a reactive-based asylum system, exile oriented, to a proac-
tive, return-oriented system (UNHCR 1995). Several UNHCR studies and recommenda-
tions continue to support this vision (Scheel and Ratfisch 2014; Unhcr 2017), which 
states have actively transposed into their legislation by building multi-level governance 
systems where new and autonomous international agencies, task forces and nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) operate today, in areas close to those of refugees’ 
origin. It is a proper global government of refugees, characterized by technocratic 
logics and preventive addresses that clearly overcome the Geneva Convention and the 
solutions that this treaty traditionally proposed. In particular, priority is given to hu-
manitarian aid programs that merely respond to the essential needs of refugees, pro-
moting the right of return as the ideal solution to their flight (Harrel-Bond 2005). Faced 
with years of poor results however, there is widespread conviction that these interven-
tions only marginally respond to truly humanitarian considerations, and on the contra-
ry, they expose refugees to high risk situations and long periods of forced territorialisa-
tion in overcrowded camps, with few of  the services necessary to ensure human digni-
ty (Terry 2002, pp. 216-245; Jones 2016). To many observers, priority is given in fact, to 
strategic practices of border externalization, ensuring new geopolitical areas of influ-
ence to the most advanced Western countries while the poorest countries have to en-
dure the social burden of reception (Pandolfi and Fassin 2010). Furthermore, as Fassin 
cleverly notes, we can view the spread of administrative patterns that submit refugees 
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to the evaluation of their physical and psychic traumas, activating a process that at 
once objectifies their bodies as the place that displays the evidence of truth, and depo-
liticizes asylum by replacing old ideological imperatives with compassionate forms of 
aid (Fassin and D'Halluin 2005).  
Important contributions have been made toward deciphering the characteristics and 
determinants of these developments by scholars who approach actual migration man-
agement through the lens of governmentality, focusing on the biopolitical dispositifs 
which allow the construction of new migrant populations, making them functional un-
der the conditions required by the current capitalist regime for the purpose of its glob-
al expansion (Sivini 2005). Following this precise analytical track, scrupulous works 
have highlighted the high cost refugees incurred when, at the close of the Fordist para-
digm, they were transformed - in the eyes of  their country of arrival - as a population 
useless and damaging to development. In Rahola's considerations, as a “population 
structurally exceeding the inclusive capabilities of global capital” (Rahola 2003, p. 15). It 
is a shift also noted by Düvell who underlines how the new productive and organiza-
tional dynamics of neoliberal capitalism require the prediction of just-in-time migration 
patterns, aimed at repatriation as soon as the temporary demand for work has been 
satisfied. But as Düvell further states, these patterns are unfit for refugees since the 
rights accorded them in the past become incompatible with the current disruption of 
the welfare state, and their migration patterns come into sharp contradiction with the 
circular dynamics that are now encouraged (Düvell 2004, p. 45). This is also what An-
namaria Vitale recounts in her work (2005), adding that the new vision of refugees as 
surplus, is bringing large supranational organizations such as the IOM, the WTO, the 
World Bank, the ILO, asking states to include their asylum prerogatives within a new 
humanitarian regime, and operating in a decentralized manner, precisely in order to 
distinguish (in a definitive manner) economic migrants from refugees, thus recognizing 
the right to mobility only for those human resources considered useful for global 
growth (Vitale 2005, pp. 27-28). For Vitale, humanitarian language masks this agenda, 
but ensures its implementation through depoliticisation: namely by excluding refugees 
from the sphere of citizenship and development, constraining them in a paternalistic 
perspective focused exclusively on charity and assistance.  
However, unlike those who find in the current international asylum system a com-
plete non-access system (Bauman 2005), Vitale states that the new imperial mobility 
regimes move within a structurally unstable economic and social context, resulting in a 
considerable gap between the declared aims and the effects that they actually achieve. 
The Calabrian scholar follows this different analytical track by stating that, what is real-
ly at stake, is the biopolitical reproduction of the proletariat on a global scale through 
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the segmentation of citizenship in a variety of increasingly precarious and reversible 
legal positions; submitting all foreigners to a similar process of depreciation, irrespec-
tive of their actual qualifications and skills, or of the reasons behind their migration.  
An analysis which we find directly reflected in the context of Italy. Here, for years, the 
increase of forced migration flows has been, in fact, accompanied by the introduction 
of liberticide measures that have severely affected the applicants and beneficiaries of 
international protection. As we will see in the next paragraph, these policies have not 
however stopped or reduced flows, rather they expose migrants and refugees to simi-
lar processes of clandestinization and exploitation in their places of arrival. 
 
 
3. The Italian asylum system: institutionalizing an emergency approach 
 
Italy has become a landmark for a growing number of asylum seekers and refugees 
only since the 1990s, when several Western European governments began to rethink, 
more restrictively, their migratory policies (Melotti, 1992). In particular, after the col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall, thousands of refugees arrived in Italy from the Albanian crisis 
of '91 and the Balkan wars that raged following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. 
And since 2000, a growing number of refugees have arrived from the Middle East and 
several African countries devastated by armed conflicts and violence, who over the 
years are still active. 
Compared to the numbers received in smaller and more fragile developing states, It-
aly however, tallies a reduced presence of refugees, with about 150,000 new arrivals 
registered in 2015 (Anci 2016). Nonetheless, many statistical surveys show an increas-
ingly hostile and alarming public opinion in relation to refugees, so much as to overlap 
the issue of forced migration with that of insecurity and international terrorism in 60% 
of cases (Wike , Stoke and Simmons 2016). At the same time, political talk about migra-
tion tends to privilege representations that paint Italy as a country under siege (Dal 
Lago 2010), left alone by the EU to cope with the overwhelming number of asylum re-
quests that have come from the many conflicts erupting in neighbouring areas of the 
Mediterranean. 
Actually, in the presence of growing crises and geopolitical instability, the Dublin Sys-
tem, which substantially obliges refugees who reach Europe to remain in the place they 
first land, should be mitigated by a provision of appropriate cooperation mechanisms 
(Article 78 of the TSUE). The same European Agenda3 which the Commission launched 
 
3 COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.05.2015.  
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in May 2015 in order to cope with the extraordinary influx of refugees registered in the 
two-year period between 2014 and 2015, proposed to implement a method of fair mi-
grant distribution among member states, called the hot spot approach. (Vitiello 2016, 
p. 147)4. The response to these inflows, and to the decision to relocate migrants from 
Italy and Greece5, was however a clear closing response. The decisions taken in this di-
rection remained in fact unimplemented, and new walls were erected in Hungary, Slo-
venia, Serbia, Macedonia, France, until even the European Commission’s aspirations 
collapsed under the weight of this increasingly uncomfortable and embarrassing im-
passe. As we know, only in March of 2016, did the Commission succeed to normalize 
this affair by economizing it: in particular by signing an agreement of about three bil-
lion Euros, which assigned Turkey the task of containing refugees fleeing from Syria in 
its territory6. However, after only one year of implementation this agreement provoked 
strong international criticism for placing thousands of refugees in limbo and exposing 
them to tragic living conditions in Turkey as well as in the hot spots installed on the 
Greek islands and in Italy (Amnesty International 2016). At the same time, the central 
Mediterranean route reopened - far more risky than the Balkan route - and with it, in-
evitable desperation and deaths.  
Since the outbreak of the European refugee crisis, the Italian Government itself has 
consistently highlighted these contradictions by strongly criticizing the Union's inability 
to respond with coordination and solidarity to the challenges posed by current forced 
migration7. But in Italy, we can grasp a process of substantial mimetic isomorphism 
which places this country in the wake of the depoliticisation dynamics first analysed 
with reference to the evolution of the international asylum regime in the global scenar-
io. It is an articulated project that, in the first place, demonstrates the consonance that 
now exists between right and left parties, where they both view the administrative de-
tention of asylum seekers as a primary instrument of migration control. At the same 
 
4 As stated by Vitiello, this mechanism provides for the establishment of specific teams of specialists, pro-
vided by EASO (European Asylum Support Office), Frontex (European Border Management Agency), Euro-
pol (Agency for EU police) and Eurojust (EU judicial cooperation agency). These teams are required to work 
in border areas to quickly conduct fingerprint identification, recording and fingerprinting of incoming mi-
grants, and the identification of those deserving international protection and promotion by relocation to 
other member states, or to facilitate their repatriation in the case of irregular migrants.  
5 See Council Decisions (Ue) 2015/1523 from September 14, 2015 and 2015/1601 from September 22, 
2015.  
6 Http://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ 
7 Lastly, the declarations issued in Brussels on June 8, 2017 by the Under Secretary of the Interior, Dome-
nico Manzione: http://www.eunews.it/2017/06/08/italia-detta-regole-revisione-dublino-asilo-
politico/87454 
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time, the questionable results this project produces cast doubt on its practicability, 
showing a movement of repeated adjustments, precisely called to neutralize the social 
fractures and conflicts that the same depoliticisation scheme enriches and perpetuates 
in its process of national territorialisation. 
On the external front in particular, the Italian government attempts to respond to 
the challenges related to the growing number of refugees, by externalizing their man-
agement by building ad hoc committees and negotiating the stipulations of specific 
economic agreements with the countries of origin and transit. Italy in particular fol-
lowed this address back in 2009, when the current centre-right government, subcon-
tracted with Libya and its military forces, the task of suppressing and remotely control-
ling direct arrivals in Italy up to the period of wars that ended with Colonel Gaddafi's 
overthrow (Rastello 2010). In February 2017, as the European relocation programs 
failed, the new centre-left Italian government continued to revitalize this approach and 
actively promote it in Europe by signing a special memorandum (MoU) National Recon-
ciliation Government with the Libyan State8. The landings however were not interrupt-
ed. Indeed, from January to March 30, 2017, 27,000 foreigners arrived in Italy, totalling 
35% more than the same period in 2016, which was also record year, with 181,436 
immigrants arriving9. In order to deal with such flows, Italy continues to act by using its 
cooperative development policies as a key instrument to control mobility, but paying 
insufficient attention to the conditions of crisis and the lack of democracy that often 
affect the partner countries of these programs. At the same time, on the internal front, 
forms of explicit emergency governance have been structured over the years, gradually 
finding full institutional recognition. 
The first phase of this development began with the end of the Cold War, when Italy 
set up an increasing number of rescue camps in order to secure the first refugee recep-
tion. It was the so called Puglia law10 that predicted these structures, justifying them as 
necessary to confront the most basic needs of refugees in a new phase  characterized 
by increasingly tragic and desperate sea voyages (Delle Donne 2004). Also at this time, 
these new forms of containment were however tied to exceptional measures such as 
those which had, already in 1991, decreed the deportation of Albanians, first to a sta-
dium in Bari, and then later to their own country (Dal Lago 1999, p. 186). It was the be-
ginning of a new era of social repression, which began to strengthen borders and 
measures of detention that found full legal coverage in 2002 with the introduction of 
 
8 Available on line: http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Libia.pdf 
9 Source UNHCR (http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205).  
10 D.L. 451/1995, converted into law L. 563/1995. 
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the Bossi-Fini law11. A law that initiated a second and even more restrictive phase, 
sanctioning the mandatory detention of applicants for international protection in spe-
cial government centres of first reception, called CARA. CARA were formally created to 
enable the identification of refugees and the processing of their application, but these 
reception centres suddenly took the form of huge militarized camps, where the aver-
age period of stay lasts for many months. As several investigations reveal, applicants 
here remain suspended in state of protracted limbo, marked by continuous abuses and 
poor living conditions, that portray a tragic regime of ethnic segregation and exclusion. 
Moreover, in very few cases the applicants in CARA, once considered worthy of protec-
tion, manage to pass to the regular structures of secondary reception that the same 
Bossi-Fini ruled by establishing the Protection System for Asylum and Refugees 
(SPRAR).  
The SPRAR was born under strong pressure from local authorities and civil society, at 
the beginning of the nineties, to promote an integrated asylum system, capable of 
supporting the territorial impact of immigration, and therefore, the development of 
more appropriate local policies and practices of inclusion (Marchetti 2006, pp. 129-
130). In fact, a primary feature of SPRAR is the protagonism of local municipalities 
which voluntarily, and through collaboration with the third sector, take on the task of 
ushering refugees towards independence by developing an integrated reception model 
which entails taking charge of a small number of individuals and sustainable housing 
practices. These modes of intervention, according to several scholars, have allowed 
SPRAR to more effectively address the needs of refugees and positively impact the ter-
ritories in recent years, especially in terms of public services and employment oppor-
tunities (Marchetti 2016). The SPRAR remains however a weak system, for reasons 
mainly related to the small amount of ministerial allocations, delays with which they 
are provided and due to the limited duration of projects in which the beneficiaries en-
ter - allowing just one year of residence - that for this reason, often leaves refugees 
with no possibility of self-insertion in host societies at the end of the projects. Moreo-
ver, SPRAR has always provided an insufficient number of places, and in fact it repre-
sents only a residual hosting system with respect to the emergency refugee manage-
ment model that Italy has strengthen following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
The main guidelines for this approach began to emerge in 2011, during the devel-
opment of an extraordinary program called Emergency North Africa (ENA) 12, when the 
 
11 Law n. 189 from July 30, 2002. 
12 This intervention started with the DPCM February 12th 2011, which declared until December 31st, 2011 
a state of humanitarian emergency in the national territory, in relation to the exceptional influx of citizens 
from North African countries (OJ No 42, February 21st, 2011). Subsequently, the DPCM of April 7th 2011 
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Berlusconi government assigned Civil Protection units the task of opening new struc-
tures to settle refugees in flight from Tunisia and Libya, that were at that time often 
housed in former restaurants, hotels or in isolated buildings. Following the closure of 
ENA, the widening of the flows recorded over the two-year period from 2014-2015 
spurred the creation of other extraordinary reception centres (CAS) in all Italian re-
gions. CAS are now under the control of prefectures and it is actually through the con-
solidation of the prefectural management of refugees, that a third stage in the granting 
of asylum has opened in Italy, whose general principles are now contained in Legisla-
tive Decree 142/2015.  
In reality, the most important innovation that this decree intended, was the scan-
ning of reception in two distinct phases, which would support the extension of second-
ary reception centres within the SPRAR network, and thus shorten the long periods of 
stay in CARA. In parallel, Legislative Decree 142/2015 assigns CAS a temporary con-
tainment function in the event of large numbers and close arrivals of applicants, when 
there is not sufficient space within the centres dedicated to the ordinary reception of 
asylum seekers. But, as the Italian Government has decided not to make the SPRAR a 
compulsory service on a territorial basis, granting local authorities the opportunity to 
voluntarily adhere, they have deprived their political agenda of the challenge of recep-
tion, so much so that calls for access to the SPRAR continue to be almost deserted 
(Camili 2016). Paradoxically, as a result of the enforcement of Decree no. 142 of 215, 
the function of CAS has thus assumed a prevalent and permanent character. In fact, as 
of December 31, 2015, there were a total of 135,045 migrants hosted in various facili-
ties in the country (CDA / CARA / CPSA /SPRAR) 96,701 of those individuals in CAS, 
14,848 were housed in first reception centres and only 23,496 went to SPRAR.  
As CAS numbers grow however, there are also a growing number of allegations 
about violations occurring inside them, as well as poor transparency by those who 
manage them. According to numerous observers13, here there are often overcrowded 
and degrading living conditions, lack of hygienic standards and adequate security, 
poorly skilled staff and limited involvement by local authorities and the surrounding 
social environment. And, as some international organizations point out (Msf 2016), all 
these factors have a very negative impact on the living conditions of refugees and the 
acceptance of their asylum application, aggravating their original vulnerabilities and 
 
extended the duration of the program in response to the massive migratory movements generated by the 
outbreak of war in Libya (OJ No 83, April 11th, 2011). 
13 Finally, see the InCastrati report, civic initiatives on the management of extraordinary reception centers 
for asylum seekers, published in 2016 by Cittadinanzattiva, LetciateCIEntrare, Libera. On-line access: 
http://www.cittadinanzattiva.it/files/primo_piano/giustizia/inCAStrati-report.pdf   
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leading them fall into situations of panic, apathy and suffering. At the same time, these 
lawless and un-welcoming situations easily become instruments of political propagan-
da delivering the message NO, also to the reception of small groups of migrants. In-
creasingly, the theme of the asylum business is agitated by mayors and communities to 
deny territorial access to everyone, even recognized holders of some form of interna-
tional protection (Lunaria 2017). This is so prevalent in fact, that the current centre-left 
government has taken note, and placed focus on the many pressures and complaints 
brought about by the mismanagement that has marked the emergency Italian ap-
proach to the European refugee crisis. Beginning with the idea that the values of the 
left cannot be dissociated from those of security, the Gentiloni cabinet has in particular 
outlined a new institutional set-up in international protection, which is now contained 
in Law no. 46 from the 13th of April 2017.  
This law again tightens the standards for international protection along guidelines 
which, according to the Interior Minister who conceived it, are intended to deflate the 
risks associated with the advance of new extremist and neo-populist forces on the 
right14. In particular, this new law aims to speed up international protection proceed-
ings limiting the applicants' right to defence. The decree pursues this objective in par-
ticular by cancelling the refugee’s right to appeal against orders denying the applica-
tion for asylum issued by the Territorial Commission for recognition of international 
protection. Thus, through this decree, the civil servants and Territorial Commissions in 
which they operate, assume the role of real first-degree courts on the basis of the 
premise, though not explicit, that refugees should be judged as such rather than based 
on their whole migratory history. At the same time, the decree reconfigures the role of 
reception centre operators, recognizing them as public officials from every legal view-
point. In short, these provisions have however triggered strong reactions and protests, 
even in the judiciary, by those who loudly denounce its unconstitutionality15. In this 
way, the ambiguity of the situation grows, and the convergence of policies in the sense 
of depoliticisation continues to sink into a space of constant tension with the expan-
sion of international migratory flows, making visible a variety of subjects and claims 
that, as we shall see, seek to fill the gap opened by inadequate regulations. 
 
 
 
14 See here the interview issued by Minister of the Interior Marco Minniti on the weekly "L'Espresso" of 
January 8, 2017.  
15 Among the many appeals that contest this law, particular attention is drawn to a note from the judges of 
the Democratic Judiciary. Available online at: https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/md-asgi-
documento-completo-press-release.pdf 
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4. Where refugees are welcome: the case study of Calabria 
 
As many researchers have pointed out, migrations are a phenomenon that varies 
considerably at the local level, where public and third sector actors can interact with 
each other, outlining divergent governance scenarios different from those handed 
down in Europe today and those to which Italy conforms (Stuppini 2013; Ambrosini 
2013). These considerations are especially valid in Calabria where, especially in the 
most internal areas, it’s possible to observe cultural orientations and reception pro-
grams of a radically different nature compared to those previously examined, those 
amenable to the phenomenon of securitization of flows and to the depoliticization of 
their management. 
In Calabria, the emergence of these aporias dates back to December 1997 when a 
boat carrying some 800 Kurdish refugees ran aground on the Ionian coast of Badolato. 
The refugees on that occasion, were immediately welcomed by the local population 
and settled in the oldest part of the city which had been decimated by emigration and 
therefore had endless available housing facilities. In that depopulated territory, it soon 
became clear that refugees could become an important resource, one that could revi-
talize a territory full of potentiality, yet on the brink of extinction. As Tonino Perna re-
members, one of the protagonists of that unusual experience, for the people of 
Badolato, it was natural to welcome the migrants. But that response soon became an 
exceptional event for so many other areas of the world where locals were accustomed 
to viewing immigrants as a public threat. In fact, the news of Badolato, a town saved 
from abandonment by the arrival of “sea wagons”, brought television crews from all 
over Europe together with many curious individuals and associations, who in that his-
torical period were experimenting with new practices based on below participation, 
and characterized by increasing attention to the local dimension. It was through this 
process that a new discourse began to appear and gain awareness in Calabria, high-
lighting the positive aspects of refugees’ active involvement in community develop-
ment, where the potential for growth is stunted by depopulation and the subsequent 
aging of the population (D’Agostino 2009; 2013). This vision has been strengthened fur-
ther over the years, a few kilometres away from Badolato, in upper Riace, a semi-
abandoned village, where today there are about 600 residents, half of whom are refu-
gees. 
Even on the Ionian coast of Riace, about 300 Kurdish exiles landed and were readily 
welcomed in 1998, in particular by the members of the Future City association, which 
was born near that landing. For three years, using only its own resources, the associa-
tion committed to tracking the available housing left empty by local emigrants, and this 
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careful accounting has become a vast network of widespread hospitality, called the Ri-
ace Village, available for the reception of refugees and also for responsible tourism. In 
the years that followed, the Riace Village was in fact able to grow further through re-
sources from the National Asylum Program (PNA) and SPRAR. Furthermore, in 2004 the 
President of the Future City Association, Domenico Lucano, was elected the Mayor of 
Riace and since then, he continues to guide this small village, fighting for the specificity 
of the territory and the human rights of refugees, which has earned him prestigious 
awards and worldwide renown16.  
As Lucano points out, from the outset, the fundamental idea behind Riace’s ap-
proach to refugees was to match the aspirations of newcomers with those of the local 
community under a single, ideal vision that expresses the fundamental values of hu-
man dignity, solidarity and social justice. Far from considering reception only as a hu-
manitarian work, Lucano, in his statements refers to forms of local citizenship and co-
operation aimed at producing trust, healthier social relationships and development 
opportunities that improve everyone's living conditions. To give substance to this uto-
pia of normality, as Lucano himself defines it, refugees are relocated within the old his-
torical centre of Riace. Here they are encouraged to work within the cooperatives and 
handcraft shops that, over the years, have been reopened in order to facilitate the sur-
vival of local knowledge and the durable insertion of refugees in the territory. What Ri-
ace is pursuing, as Lucano explains, is indeed “A global reception that refuses bureau-
cratic and identity limits”, and this requires a continuous review of national policies, 
opening them up for discussion and making them more attentive to the local dimen-
sion. Lucano carries out this policy stretching operation daily, by for example, extend-
ing the period of stay of refugees welcomed in SPRAR. Furthermore, in order to com-
pensate for delays in the reimbursement of expenses incurred by the municipality from 
the Ministry of the Interior (which often takes months), a special local currency was al-
located to asylum seekers to use in Riace and neighbouring territories that adhere to 
the initiative. At the same time, Lucano managed to create an important coalition with 
neighbouring municipalities that share similar economic and demographic problems, 
and as in Riace, have expressed strong ambitions for recognition in the  vocation of re-
ception. Over time, these communities together formed what has become known as 
the backbone of hospitality. 
In these places, refugee reception has become a political theme of paramount im-
portance. A theme which, in the words of Ilario Ammendolia, mayor of Caulonia, leads 
us to see refugees as “active participants in the revitalization of the area, and therefore 
 
16 The latest illustration of his influence dates back to March 2016, when Domenico Lucano was ranked 
fortieth of  the fifty most influential world leaders.  
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not only as victims in need of care or undergoing inspection, violations and degenera-
tion by the right”. In parallel, the rights of territories are stressed, in order to make au-
tonomous and strategic choices that meet their specificities, rather than accepting out-
side regulations and models, so much so that, in 2009, Caulonia symbolically began to 
recognize foreigners’ right to vote, and they have also established intercultural cooper-
atives that respond to the shared labour needs of refugees and their host communities. 
Peace, disarmament and self-governance are the guiding principles behind these politi-
cal initiatives which have, from Badolato, progressively spread to all other Calabrian 
provinces, emphasizing the need to build reception projects that can give adequate at-
tention to individuals while countering problems like decline in production, demo-
graphic depopulation and youth emigration. This clearly emerges from field research 
on the most peripheral and marginal communities where, apart from the political col-
our of government coalitions, there is a clear effort to save essential services and re-
populate villages through integrated programs of urban regeneration and reception. 
The difficulties of this current phase however are not difficult to perceive.   
As many operators point out in their interviews, even in Calabria, through the grow-
ing bureaucratization of SPRAR, a strong alliance has been cemented over the years, 
between participating municipalities and the Ministry of the Interior funding these pro-
jects.  At the same time, all the responsibilities and critics of the system are placed on 
the backs the third sector. Meanwhile, non-government organizations have stopped 
demanding and stimulating local governs, for fear of compromising the economic rela-
tionship that binds them, and in this way they have become mere service providers. 
But the situation, as a whole, is far from being be normalized. Yet different experiences 
are strongly characterized from a political point of view and identity, because of the at-
titude of the associations that manage reception projects, or rather the municipalities 
that are in charge. This is the case in Villa San Giovanni, Decollatura, Acquaformosa, 
Carlopoli, Lamezia Terme and Cinquefrondi, and we feel this most strongly in Cinque-
frondi, a small town in the province of Reggio Calabria, where the administration head-
ed by Michele Conia has recently launched a public appeal to the government to pro-
mote the legal protection of environmental refugees, since considering the current 
regulation inadequate to recognize the complexity of current forced migration. Strong-
er yet was the all consuming clash between Lucano and the Interior Ministry when he 
was asked to revoke the use of the local currency he invented, a request that Lucano 
also denounced in the national media by highlighting the great divide between the 
technical operation of the state and the legitimacy of its approaches (Messinetti 2016). 
In this battle Lucano is also joined by strong support from the municipality of Gioiosa 
Ionica, Cinquefrondi, and the entire Solidarity Network of Municipalities (Recosol). Gio-
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vanni Maiolo, Recosol's Calabrian spokesman, does not miss as opportunity to de-
nounce the evolution of SPRAR in the time of the European refugee crisis, based in log-
ic aimed at ensuring savings on public spending. Maiolo as well underlines how SPRAR 
centres "are shaping their own premises, favouring access to  large associations that 
care only for selected categories of persecuted people, often without guaranteeing the 
real will to build reception programs that meet the actual needs of refugees and the ar-
ea."17  
Even political leaders in the Region of Calabria, have recognized the value of the Ria-
ce model and the importance of supporting it with more conviction. It is no coincidence 
that the various regional presidents who have succeeded since 2005, have stated that 
they want to provide a more organic perspective on this experience. This continued un-
til a special regional law on the reception of refugees was launched in December 2008 
(L. 18/2009). Its main feature, was to take full advantage of the ethical governance sys-
tem developed in Riace, and to support it through additional resources, not only those 
from SPRAR, in order to provide for the integration of policies aimed at welcoming in-
ternational protection applicants and beneficiaries of other programs aimed at experi-
menting with new forms of social housing and solidarity economy, to be achieved es-
pecially in communities affected by increasing depopulation or those with especially 
problematic socio-economic situations. (art. 1). The main regional measures activated 
to implement Law no. 18/2009 and stabilize the refugees within small Calabrian munic-
ipalities, have so far consisted of trained apprenticeships and work grants which, as au-
thorities intended, should have extended the short reception period provided by 
SPRAR, and blocked the continuous turn-over of refugees that we find inside. However, 
the lack of continuous national guidance and participation in the promotion of internal 
areas through the reception of refugees, coupled with the fragility of the contexts in 
which these experiences have been promoted, have not provided long-lasting em-
ployment opportunities for asylum applicants who remain the primarily spectators of 
other social protagonists (Corrado and D’Agostino 2016). Moreover, even in Calabria, 
new subjective expressions are clearly emerging that aim to physically divert refugees 
into another places and occupations, exacerbating the current situations of extreme 
housing disadvantage and exploitation that mark the vocational field of agriculture in 
this region (Corrado 2011). 
The new POR Calabria 2014-2020 explicitly references these most extreme situa-
tions, and in fact provides various measures for foreign nationals which are required in 
order to ensure global involvement through: the strengthening of basic territorial ser-
 
17 From a declaration issued during the Conference held at the University of La Sapienza on 6/24/2016: 
"Let’s help: New methods for refugee reception ".    
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vices, the improvement of skills especially in specific sectors of the solidarity economy, 
and the promotion of desegregation through the development of innovative and sus-
tainable ways of living (OT9). In October 2016, a specific plan was also presented to the 
European Commission - “Reception system for the relocation and resettlement of refu-
gees, asylum seekers and holders of humanitarian and subsidiary protection and ac-
companying minors and victims of trafficking” - which proposes the emptying of exist-
ing CAS and the reintegration of about 3000-4000 refugees to build “Civic Labs” based 
on the enhancement of individual skills, the expansion of housing and support for the 
creation of innovative social enterprises18. To be implemented however, this program 
requires strong support from Europe and the central government. For officials working 
in the National and Community Planning Departments of Calabria, that is all that is 
missing. As an official at the top of the Department says, Calabria is a system that 
boasts many good practices "but in the current phase there is a clear will to convey all 
European resources, destined for the regions, into the hands of the Interior Ministry, 
which employs them by pursuing exclusive security objectives." The fears that thwart 
the efforts made so far are clear to see, because there is always someone "who arro-
gates the right to decide what must be done, transforming the good practices that Ca-
labria should boast into an assistential and short-lived system." 
The region does not give up however, and indeed entrusts the delegation of immi-
gration to Giovanni Manoccio, former mayor of Acquaformosa, another small town 
that has distinguished itself in the political landscape nationally and internationally by 
launching various anti-racist battles19. The delegation that Giovanni Manoccio brings 
forward openly overturns the securitarian logic that for many years has defined the na-
tional approach to the issue of refugees. According to Manoccio "these same national 
policies in fact, produce a serious domino effect, seeking to solve the same problems 
that they create, certifying fears, uncertainties and summary administrative procedures 
that create further pockets of irregularities." From this firm belief, Manoccio strongly 
denounced the current wording of Law 46/2017 in an open letter to the government, 
even though the law was conceived by a minister who militates in his own party20. To-
day, Calabria contends a widespread awareness of the potential associated with the 
reception of forced migration as well as its inevitability. A recent note from the region-
al press office highlights that. Following the publication of SPRAR applications received 
 
18 Presented in Brussels the 7th and 8th of July 2016.  
19 A recent article that gives attention to this important reality is available at: 
http://www.unita.tv/opinioni/migranti-il-modello-acquaformosa-oggetto-di-studio-nel-cuore-delleuropa/ 
20 Available at: http://www.corrieredellacalabria.it/politics/item/53382-migranti,-riaprire-i-cie-%C3%A8-
un-errore 
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by March 31, 2017, it in particular reports that Calabria carries out the largest number 
of projects in Italy with respect to the resident population. And in sharp contrast to the 
rest of the country, the over 3,000 refugees already present here exceed the numbers 
registered in the CAS circuit, testifying Calabria as the "Guide Region in the field of re-
ception."21 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As this work has shown, depoliticisation is an indispensable concept through which 
we can understand the mechanisms linking new ways of managing refugees to experi-
mentation with new social and productive relationships. The subsumption of refugees' 
conditions in the narrative and practice of humanitarian emergency, constitutes a clear 
prerequisite for an increasing de-evolution of functions and areas of competence with-
in a transnational control apparatus that, without reducing the size of the flows and 
meeting the real needs of refugees, reveals itself as a fundamental dispositif for raciali-
sation, undermining and defrauding social relations.  
Today’s asylum industry maximizes the weight of bureaucratic and private actors, 
and minimizes the role of politics, which is well inclined to delegate the task of reduc-
ing the right of asylum by promoting extraterritorial containment in order to not com-
promise its equally democratic and liberal facade. Yet, as we have seen, depoliticisation 
requires the decisive and continuous help of the state and its articulations. To prevail, 
it needs not only to dismantle the old legal spaces in favour of new technocratic forms 
of control, but also to continually, convincingly and territorially penetratingly, repro-
duce stereotypes and hierarchical relationships of assistance that objectify refugees as 
mere victims or impostors. What lies ahead however, is not a normalised picture. The 
stability that the permanent state of exception should have secured in Italy remains 
unpersuasive as opposed to the growth of flows, and to the critical mass of human 
rights violations which are now chronically unstable and marked by a complex galaxy of 
subjectivities and actors who emerge to compensate for the failures highlighted by the 
global governance of refugees and its national prosthesis. Here the situation can evolve 
in diverse and conflicting ways. We can well observe the rise of political cultures that 
clearly break the catholic matrix approach that in the past connoted Italian migration 
policies (Melotti 2006), opening it up to security measures helping to prevent and 
 
21 Available at: http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2017/05/31/calabria-pubblicata-la-graduatoria-bandi-
sprar-la-calabria-regione-con-maggior-numero-di-progetti-approvati-516435/ 
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streamline asylum applications, but this trend struggles to take root in a homogeneous 
way in many areas of the country. The research carried out in Calabria reveals, in fact, 
how here economic and demographic suffering have lead to feelings of abandonment 
and a strong sensitivity to inequality which, in its most internal areas, becomes the 
platform from which to launch new alliances that unify the needs of old and new resi-
dents, bringing widespread awareness to their shared condition of subalternity. The 
historical development of these experiences continues to illuminate the inadequacy of 
current emergency models with respect to the real dynamics of migration, and espe-
cially shows how Calabria remains a patchy region, where innovative experiences of lo-
cal citizenship which focus attention on opportunities for rebirth and development that 
the presence of refugees presents, can counteract and coexist with acute profit situa-
tions based on poor acceptance, social exclusion and exploitation in the workplace 
(Medu 2015).  
We cannot deny, in fact, that even these most virtuous and inclusive practices do 
not manage to arrest the territorial spread of fears and social dynamics that compro-
mise the initial promises of reciprocity and inclusion for both native citizens and refu-
gees, thus diminishing the viability of refugee relocation within the internal areas as a 
truly sustainable process. But it is really the tragic ambivalence of the whole regional 
context, the polarization that it highlights between desegregated reception models 
which try to guarantee refugees decent living conditions and their long term stabiliza-
tion, and situations of racialisation which tend instead to resist and become more 
acute over time; it’s this clear ambivalence which reveals depoliticisation to be a con-
tested field, open to multiple and indefinable territorial declinations (Fantozzi 2004).  
From here, it is important to properly address the processes of depoliticisation 
which undoubtedly characterizes the evolution of the global asylum system in consid-
eration of existing connections between macro, intermediate and micro levels; follow-
ing an interactive approach, methodologically capable of recognizing the productive 
not only repressive nature of power (Foucault 1994). In conclusion, an approach capa-
ble of distinguishing the utopia of power from the domain system that it actually real-
izes when instances and tensions coming from worlds that should have remained dis-
tant, mingle with other cultures and territories, forging subjective expressions and 
compositions that may exceed the perimeter of the macro scheme and its depoliticisa-
tion goals, obliging it to continually move and transform.  
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